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Introduction
In order to alter the trend of persistent unemployment over recent decades, the majority of OECD countries have invested vast amounts of public funds in active labour market policies (ALMPs; Martin, 2014; Martin & Grubb, 2001 ). These investments have logically resulted in a surge in micro-econometric research evaluating the effectiveness of these policy instruments (Card et al., 2010 (Card et al., , 2015 Greenberg et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve, 2010; Liechti et al., 2017) . The results of these evaluations are mixed at best. Overall, the effectiveness of ALMPs in terms of exit out of unemployment depends largely on the type of ALMP, its target group and the time horizon of the evaluation (Card et al., 2010 (Card et al., , 2015 Kluve, 2010; Martin & Grubb, 2001 ). Moreover, the few studies that have taken the costs of these programmes into account indicate that the benefits of ALMPs do not outweigh their costs (Albanese et al., 2016; Card et al., 2015; Crépon et al., 2013; Jespersen et al., 2008) .
The ALMP central to this study, a job-vacancy referral scheme, exhibits the same mixed effectiveness. While some studies find positive results of this kind of programme with respect to exit out of unemployment (Bollens & Cockx, 2016; Fougère et al., 2009; van den Berg et al., 2014) , others find no impact at all (Engström et al, 2012; van den Berg & van der Klaauw, 2006) . Moreover, some of the studies that present positive effects of job-vacancy referrals show that the higher job-finding rate as a result of referral goes hand in hand with a lower job quality (van den Berg et al., 2016; van den Berg & Vikström, 2014) .
Measuring the effectiveness of these policies in terms of their desired outcomes is in no doubt important. However, if one aims to reform ALMPs to increase their effectiveness, one needs to go beyond measuring and look at possible explanations for the unsatisfactory effectiveness. One possible explanation documented in the literature is the signal associated with ALMPs. Signalling theory states that when individuals are faced with limited information, they will use particular components of this information to predict unobserved factors (Arrow, 1973; Blanchard & Diamond, 1994; Moscarini, 1977; Spence, 1973; Vishwanath, 1983) . In this respect, we can expect a positive as well as a negative signal sent to prospective employers by a job-vacancy referral.
1 On the one hand, candidates applying for a position at the request of a public employment service (PES) have gone through an initial screening process and have been deemed suitable for the position by the PES. In other words, the vacancy referral could be seen as a signal of improved suitability (Bellis et al., 2011) . On the other hand, employers could see referred applicants as candidates who do not have the ability to succeed in the labour market on their own and/or only apply to comply with benefit rules (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2014) .
As a consequence, being referred to a vacancy has been theoretically related to lower intellectual and/or social abilities (Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2014) , lower trainability (Thurow, 1975) , negative evaluation by previous employers (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and, most commonly cited, lower motivation (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014) .
The existing empirical literature on the signal of ALMPs is limited and mainly of a qualitative nature (Bellis et al., 2011; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014; Liechti et al., 2017) . Little or no causal evidence has been presented for signalling as an explanation for the limited effectiveness of these policies. Falk et al. (2005) and Liechti et al. (2017) are notable exceptions. By means of a field experiment, Falk et al. (2005) measure how completing a computer training programme impacts job-finding rates. More concretely, they compare the call-back rates for job candidates with and without this kind of training.
They find that completing a computer training programme does not yield higher call-back rates. Liechti et al. (2017) quantify the signalling value of different types of ALMPs, including training programmes and subsidised employment, by means of a factorial survey experiment. They find that employers do take ALMP participation into account when making hiring decisions, but the signalling effect of this participation can be both positive as well as negative, depending on the potential candidate's distance from the labour market.
In this study, we investigate the signalling value of a distinct type of ALMP: a job-vacancy referral. To this aim, we conduct a state-of-the-art vignette experiment with human resource (HR) professionals. We ask these participants to make fictitious hiring decisions The present study complements the work by Falk et al. (2005) and Liechti et al. (2017) by quantifying the signalling value of a different type of ALMP. In addition, by means of answering R3, we contribute to this literature by being the first to investigate which signal (s) is (are) particularly sent by participation in ALMPs in general and applying under a vacancy referral scheme in particular. This is of particular policy relevance because it shows which prejudices against the unemployed applying for jobs under a job-vacancy referral scheme should be compensated for.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, our experimental design, and the realised data collection. Our research questions are answered in Section 3, where results from analysis of the experimental data are presented. Section 4 concludes, focussing on both the academic and policy implications of our research.
Experiment
To answer R1, R2, and R3, we conducted a vignette experiment. In this kind of experiment, participants are asked to judge fictitious descriptions (presented on vignettes) that differ on a pre-defined number of variables (the vignette factors), which are randomly assigned a value (the vignette-levels; Jasso, 2006; Rossi & Nock, 1982; Sauer et al., 2011) . As a consequence of these design features, correlation between the vignette factors are minimised to a value close to 0 (Rossi & Nock, 1982) , a situation which rarely occurs outside an experimental setting. The biggest advantage of vignette experiments is, therefore, that they enable scholars to give a causal interpretation to the measured effects of the included vignette factors on human decisions (Damelang & Abraham, 2016; Wallander, 2009) . Moreover, as opposed to field experiments, vignette experiments have the added benefit of creating the opportunity to ask additional questions to unravel the thinking process behind certain decisions and, consequently, to shed light on why we observe certain phenomena.
Vignette experiments have recently been the method of choice for a number of prominent studies in sociology and economics investigating human judgement (Ambuehl & Ockenfels, 2017; Auspurg et al., 2017; Eriksson & Kristensen, 2014; Mathew, 2017; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016) . In particular, this type of experiment has been increasingly used to study dynamics in hiring decisions (Auer et al., 2016; Damelang & Abraham, 2016; Di Stasio, 2014; Di Stasio & Gërxhani, 2015; Liechti et al., 2017; McDonald, 2017; Van Belle et al., 2017; Van Hoye & Lievens, 2003) . In this application of the vignette experimentation framework, participants have to judge fictitious candidates with divergent characteristics as vignette factors. As a consequence, these vignette experiments closely mimic real-life hiring situations, where HR professionals also take a number of characteristics into account when making hiring decisions. In our application, we included as a vignette factor whether job candidates applied to this vacancy under a job-vacancy referral system or on their own initiative. Exogenous variation in this factor would be hard to find in observational data.
The next subsections describe the specific institutional framework under study, the design of our vignettes, and the data gathering process. We return to some potential limitations of our experimental design in Section 4.
Institutional Framework
Our study focusses on a job-vacancy referral scheme implemented by the PES of Flanders, the northern part of Belgium. Bollens and Cockx (2016) used a timing-of-events approach to investigate the effectiveness of this job-vacancy referral scheme in terms of entry to employment. They found substantial positive treatment effects both during the month of the referral and over the course of the following months. However, the positive total effect of the referral measured by Bollens and Cockx (2016) combines supply-side and demand-side effects of the programme so that it does not rule out a negative signalling effect of this job-vacancy referral scheme. Moreover, at the time of the evaluation performed by Bollens and Cockx (2016) , employers were informed about the referral in approximately only 25% of the cases, so that demand-side dynamics might have been less influential then.
Vignette Design
We asked a sample of HR professionals described in the subsection below to evaluate a set of five vignettes, each describing one potential fictitious candidate for an open vacancy.
These job applicants differed in the six vignette factors defined in Table 1 . The main factor of interest was the one indicating whether or not candidates were referred to the position by the PES. 4 More precisely, and in line with reality, candidate summaries could either 2 More concretely, this happens automatically via a software program for employers with a profile in the PES database and manually-but very soon after the matching is done-for employers without such a profile. 3 The information on the referral procedure was given to us by caseworkers of the PES of Flanders. A transcript of this information is available upon request. 4 As argued in Subsection 2.1, it is highly likely that a Flemish employer is aware that a candidate is referred to a position by the PES so that this is a realistic vignette factor. mention that the candidate applied for the position directly or was referred by the PES. In the latter case, it was mentioned explicitly that this entailed that the candidate was obliged to apply for this suitable vacancy. Besides this factor, applicants differed in gender (male or female), educational attainment (secondary education certificate or bachelor's degree), previous work experience (two or five years), whether they mentioned social activities (none or volunteering activities), and unemployment duration prior to the application (1 to 36 months). These vignette factors were chosen on the basis of a literature review of drivers of job-application success (Damelang & Abraham, 2016; Di Stasio, 2014; Di Stasio & Gërxhani, 2015; Liechti et al., 2017; Van Belle et al., 2017) and an interview with three HR professionals.
5 In addition, we ran a pilot study with 30 master's students in Economics to test whether our vignettes were perceived as plausible and that no crucial information was omitted.
< Table 1 vignettes, allowing us to achieve a D-efficiency of 99.809. 6 Each participant was randomly assigned one of these 60 sets. The resulting correlations between our vignette factors can be found in Table A1 (in Appendix A) and show that our randomisation approach was successful.
Data Collection
We conducted our experiment in January 2017 with Flemish recruiters. The experiment was
where is the vector of the vignette variables, indicates the number of vignettes in the sample and presents the number of regression coefficients (including the intercept) in the analysis of the experimental data. For more information, we refer to .
part of a large-scale survey performed with individuals that selected themselves in a database of volunteers for participation in research on human resource management. At the start of this survey, the participants were asked whether they had been actively involved in the hiring process a minimum of five times during the past year. Participants who answered this question in a positive way had a 50% probability of being assigned to our experiment (and a 50% probability of being assigned to the experiment of Van Belle et al. (2017)). In total, 234 recruiters took part in our experiment. Of these respondents, 29 left one or more questions unanswered, leaving us with a total sample of 205 participants. Each participant rated five vignettes, yielding a total of 1,025 at the participant-vignette level.
respectively.
In addition, in view of answering R3, participants were prompted to rate five statements (also on a 7-point Likert scale) linked to the different signals that could be sent by a jobvacancy referral prevalent in the literature and as described in Section 1. So, perceptions concerning the candidates' (i) motivation, (ii) intellectual abilities, (iii) social abilities, (iv) trainability, and (v) previous unfavourable evaluation by other employers were tested. The statements used can be found in Table A2 . We limited the experimental survey to one statement per signal to keep the overall time taken up by the experiment within a reasonable limit (taking into account that each respondent was asked to review multiple profiles).
Finally, in view of answering R2, some personal characteristics of the respondents were surveyed, including their gender, age, nationality, educational attainment, frequency of hiring, and experience with the hiring process.
Panel A of Table 2 presents some summary statistics concerning the participants in our experiment. Participants had an average age of about 43 years, with most being Belgian nationals and having some form of tertiary education. They were slightly more likely to be female than male. A total of 46.8% of the respondents indicated that they recruited someone on at least a weekly basis, while 55.1% indicated having at least ten years' experience as a recruiter.
< Table 2 about here > In columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 the research sample is split by the referral status of the judged job candidate. Column (4) presents the difference between these two columns as well as the results of a t-test to determine whether these differences are statistically significant. Given that each respondent judged five candidate profiles, our data are inherently nested. We control for this by clustering at the participant level. Overall, the information in Panel A of Table 2 allows us to conclude that referral status was successfully randomised over the participants.
Results

Does Applying for a Job Under a Job Referral Scheme Yield Lower
Hiring Chances?
A first indication of the signalling effect of applying for a job under a job-vacancy referral scheme is given in Figure 1 . On the left-hand side, the average rating on the interview and hiring scales by referral status is depicted. It is clear that candidates referred to the vacancy by the PES are both less likely to be invited for an interview (p = 0.000) and less likely to be hired (p = 0.000) for the position. The average rating on the interview (hiring) scale is 0.657 (0.643) lower for referred candidates than for direct applicants. In other words, given that the standard deviation of the interview (hiring) scale is 1.608 (1.414), being referred to the vacancy decreases the probability of an interview (getting hired) by 40.9% (45.5%) of a standard deviation. The same information can be inferred from Panel B of Table 2 .
< Figure 1 about here > Due to our experimental set-up-the referral dummy is, by design, uncorrelated with any of the other observable candidate characteristics-these effects can be given a causal interpretation. In addition, due to the random allocation of vignette sets to participants, we do not expect any correlation with the participant characteristics. This is also confirmed when we estimate the following econometric model: The estimation results of this model are reported in column (1) of Table 3 and Table A3, with the interview and hiring scales as respective outcomes. Again, in Panel A of this table,
we observe that candidates who are referred to the position by the PES are less likely to be invited for an interview-the related coefficient is substantial in both economic and statistical terms. This clearly indicates that being referred to a position by the PES has a negative signalling effect in respect of employers. This finding corroborates the qualitative evidence on the signalling effect of ALMP participation mentioned in Section 1 (Bellis et al., 2011; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014) . Moreover, the negative signal of a job-vacancy referral could be part of the explanation for the unsatisfactory results of these programmes in terms of employment outcomes. Finally, our finding indicates that the positive effect of the Flemish referral system on employment outcomes, as found in Bollens and Cockx (2016), could be even larger if this adverse signalling effect could be reduced. We return to this point in Section 4.
< Table 3 B of Table 3) , we see that female and older recruiters are more lenient in their judgement, while recruiters who are involved in the hiring process at least once a week tend to be stricter.
The corresponding estimation results when adopting the hiring scale as the outcome variable (Table A3 , column (1)) are largely in line with the discussed results when using the interview scale as the dependent variable. However, the significant effect of recruiter 8 The fact that mentioning volunteering activities appears to have a larger effect on one's hiring chances than having completed a higher education programme or having three years of additional work experience might seem surprising. However, this result is in line with what is found by Baert and Vujić (in press) , who show by means of a field experiment that job candidates mentioning volunteering receive one-third more interview invitations. Moreover, multiple studies have shown that volunteering activities appear to have a positive impact on earnings (Day & Devlin, 1997 , 1998 Detollenaere et al., 2017; Gozzi et al., 2013; Hackl et al., 2007; Prouteau & Wolff, 2006; Sauer, 2015) and that this volunteer work, when done by ethnic minorities, may even cancel out ethnic discrimination in the labour market (Baert & Vujic, 2016) . gender disappears.
Is this Effect Heterogeneous by Candidate and Subject
Characteristics?
To determine whether the signalling effect of the job-vacancy referral depends on other candidate characteristics, we re-estimate equation (1) including interaction terms between the referral dummy and each of the five other vignette factors. After including these interactions, the remaining coefficient of the referral dummy should be interpreted as the effect of a referral for a reference candidate, i.e. a male candidate with high school certification and two years' experience who has been unemployed for zero months and did not mention any social activities on his CV. The results of this exercise are reported in column (2) of Table 3 and Table A3 . We find that the signalling value of the job-vacancy referral scheme is not moderated by any of the other candidate characteristics. In particular, it is interesting to note that the negative effect of a PES referral does not vary with the length of the unemployment spell. If we observed such an interaction effect, this could have been interpreted as suggestive evidence of employers assuming that the long-term unemployed simply apply via the PES to keep receiving benefits (without being intrinsically motivated to fill the vacancy).
Secondly, in column (3) of Table 3 and Table A3 we present the results of a similar analysis to study whether the effect of the job-vacancy referral is heterogeneous by type of recruiter. More concretely, compared to column (1), interaction terms between referral and the participant characteristics are adopted. In contrast to the candidate characteristics, the observed participant characteristics are not experimentally controlled and can, as a consequence, correlate with unobserved participant traits. Thus, the interaction effects presented in column (3) cannot be given a causal interpretation. However, we find that the effect of being referred to a vacancy is not heterogeneous by any of the participant characteristics.
Which Signals Are Sent by Applying for a Job Under a Job Referral
Scheme?
In this subsection, we explore what exactly is signalled by the job-vacancy referral scheme, thereby examining why applying via a referral decreases one's hiring chances. The righthand side of Figure 1 (and Panel C of Table 2) gives us a first indication of the empirical importance of the possible signals put forward in the literature and enumerated in Section 1. It is revealed that the candidates who apply for the open vacancy directly, without action by the PES, score better, on average, on all five statements related to these signals than those candidates who have been referred to the vacancy by the PES. So, referred candidates are, indeed, perceived as less motivated, less intellectually gifted, less socially gifted and less trainable, as well as having been rejected more often by other employers. These perceptions are statistically significant (at the 1% level), with the exception of the last one. In terms of economic significance, it is striking that the effect of referral on perceived motivation of the candidate is substantially higher than its effect on the other perception scales. Table 4 (Table A4 ). Just as was the case with the overall signalling effect discussed in Section 3.1, the effect of the referral on each of the five perceptions concerning the candidate (i.e. the in our model) can be interpreted as causal effects as a consequence of the random assignment of a referral to the vignettes. In contrast, the effect of these perceptions on the interview (and hiring) scale (i.e. the in our model) cannot be given a causal interpretation as the included mediators could correlate with other, unobserved, signals related to applying under a job-vacancy referral system. As a consequence, also the mediation effects should be seen as associations rather than as causal effects. We return to this point in Section 4. These findings corroborate the evidence from qualitative research suggesting that referral is seen as a signal of lower motivation (Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2014) .
They seem to indicate that employers do view the candidates who apply via the PES as candidates who mainly apply in order to continue receiving benefits, which contrasts with the insignificant interaction effect between referral and unemployment duration, as elaborated on in Subsection 3.2.
The results of the mediation analysis with the probability of being hired for the position as the outcome variable are largely similar to the results with the probability of a job interview as the outcome variable.
Conclusion
This article contributed to the literature on the effectiveness of active labour market policies. As argued, the evaluation literature has mainly focused on measuring the overall effectiveness of these programmes, with mixed results. Therefore, in our opinion, the logical next step to take in this literature is to explain why this unsatisfactory effectiveness exists.
In this study, we investigated the signalling effect of applying for a job through a vacancy referral scheme. Based on a vignette experiment with HR professionals, we provided first causal evidence for a large negative effect of being referred on one's probability of getting invited to a job interview and finally getting the job. In addition, our experimental design candidates. In the first situation, it is important to know whether those referred are intrinsically less motivated or whether it is the referral which causes the lower motivation.
If those referred are intrinsically less motivated, the PES should link the referrals to other policies to increase the benefit recipient's motivation. If it is the referral that is lowering the benefit recipient's motivation, one might question the usefulness of the referral scheme. If, on the other hand, the second scenario is the true scenario, it is important to reverse the negative perception of referred applicants. We see two ways of doing this. One way would be simply not to inform employers of the referral status of applicants. As aforementioned, at the time of Bollens and Cockx's (2016) study, the employer was only informed of a candidate being referred by the PES in approximately 25% of the cases. As they found a large positive effect of the referral on job-finding probabilities, this suggests that not informing employers about a referral could indeed mitigates the negative effect on hiring probabilities.
However, if the unemployed person is aware that the employer is not informed about the existence of the referral, and consequently, the PES cannot effectively monitor compliance, this might lower the overall effectiveness of the referral as there will no longer be a threat effect. Another way would entail the PES informing employers better that the referred candidates have gone through an initial screening and should therefore be a better match to the vacancy than other candidates. Overall, our findings suggest that there is room for improvement in the implementation of the vacancy referral scheme in Flanders.
We end this article by acknowledging some limitations inherent to our experimental approach. Firstly, contrary to field experiments, the data collection within a vignette experiment does not take place under real-life circumstances, and participants are aware that they are taking part in an experiment. This creates the risk of participants answering in a socially desirable way. However, we believe this to be less of a concern in our vignette experiment for a number of reasons. An important feature of a vignette experiment is that each participant is shown only a small number of vignettes, and these vary on a number of factors. Therefore, it is very difficult for the participant to ascertain the socially desirable answer Liechti et al., 2017; Mutz, 2011) . Vignette experiments have been able to identify unequal treatment, even when used to investigate socially sensitive topics such as unequal treatment based on gender and race .
Moreover, if we did record some socially desirable answers in our experiment, the results described in this study could be seen as a lower bound of the true effects. To determine whether or not this is the case, it would be interesting to replicate our study by means of a field experiment, although it would not be straightforward to inform employers on the referral status of applicants in a realistic way, and this type of experiment would not allow insight into the specific signals of a job-vacancy referral scheme. Secondly, it is important to recall that we only measured the effect of referral on hiring for individuals with a specific profile applying for a specific position. As a consequence, we cannot say to what extent our results are generalisable to settings with different jobs and candidate profiles. Further research is necessary to ensure the robustness of our results in another setting (see also Van Belle et al., 2017) . Thirdly, as mentioned in Section 3.3, we cannot give a causal interpretation to our mediation analysis aimed at decomposing the overall effect of referral on hiring chances into a direct effect and five indirect effects via the particular signals theoretically related to a referral. While the treatment of a referral is randomly assigned to the fictitious job candidates within our experiment, the five potential signals related to this referral are not experimentally manipulated. As a consequence, they may correlate with other, unobserved, perceptions. Nevertheless, we believe that the suggestive evidence for our overall (and causal) negative signalling effect of applying for a vacancy under a referral scheme being, to a large extent, explained by a negative (and causal) impact of applying under this scheme on signalled motivation is a substantial input for further research. Business and Psychology, 18, 15-30. Vishwanath, T. (1989) . Job search, stigma effect, and escape rate from unemployment. , 7, 487-502 . 
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Mediation Model with Interview Scale as Outcome
Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) for the mediation model outlined in Subsection 3.3. stands for the total effect, ' for the direct effect, and for the indirect effects of a referral on the likelihood of an interview invitation passing through mediator . Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the participant level. The confidence intervals for the mediation effects are based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. Figure A1 .
Mediation Model with Hiring Scale as Outcome
Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) for the mediation model outlined in Subsection 3.3. stands for the total effect, ' for the direct effect, and for the indirect effects of a referral on the likelihood of hiring passing through mediator . Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the participant level. The confidence intervals for the mediation effects are based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. Note. PES stands for the Public Employment Service (of Flanders). The factorial product of the vignette levels (2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 36 × 2) resulted in 1,152 possible combinations. Sets of five vignettes were drawn from this vignette universe using a D-efficient design (D-efficiency: 99.809; and distributed at random to the participants as described in Subsection 2.2. This guaranteed that the vignette factors were nearly orthogonal, as shown in Table A1 . Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for the regression model outlined in Subsection 3.2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the participant level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. Note. Cramer's V is reported as all values being categorical. These statistics are based on the full sample of 1,025 observations. Table A2 .
Signals and Accompanying Statements
Signal Statement
Perceived motivation I think this person will be sufficiently motivated to perform properly in this job.
Perceived intellectual abilities I think this person possesses sufficient intellectual abilities to perform properly in this job.
Perceived social abilities I think this person possesses sufficient social abilities to perform properly in this job.
Perceived trainability I think this person will be easy to train.
Perceived evaluation by other employers I think this person has often been rejected by other employers.
Note. All statements are translated from Dutch. The scale with respect to the perceived evaluation by other employers is reverse scored. 
